| High pressure or overpressure |
More pressure |
Blocked outlet, runaway reaction, excessive heating, control-valve failure, gas expansion |
Vessel rupture, toxic release, fire, explosion, personnel injury |
Design pressure and temperature margin; pressure-relief compatibility; suitable materials; verified fatigue and corrosion allowance; containment of hazardous fluids |
Pressure alarm, independent high-pressure trip, relief device, emergency shutdown, blast-resistant layout |
Perform a documented risk assessment. A safety instrumented function may be required when non-instrumented layers do not reduce risk sufficiently. |
| Loss of containment |
No flow / More flow / Other than |
Seal failure, gasket degradation, pipe fracture, corrosion, erosion, incorrect assembly |
Toxic exposure, flammable vapor cloud, environmental release, equipment damage |
Compatible metallurgy and elastomers; double mechanical seals where justified; leak detection; drainage and secondary containment; maintainable isolation points |
Gas or liquid detection, ventilation, bunding, isolation valves, emergency response systems |
SIL is assigned to a defined safety function, not to the vessel, pump, or valve as a general label. Validate the complete sensor–logic solver–final element loop. |
| High temperature or thermal runaway |
More temperature |
Cooling failure, incorrect feed ratio, catalyst overdose, loss of agitation, exothermic reaction acceleration |
Decomposition, overpressure, fire, explosion, toxic decomposition products |
Adequate heat-removal capacity; independent temperature measurement; emergency quench or dump system; compatible reactor materials; safe agitation design |
High-high temperature trip, independent cooling, emergency quench, relief system, controlled feed shutdown |
Use reaction calorimetry and consequence analysis before selecting safeguards. The required SIL depends on initiating-event frequency and the reliability of other independent layers. |
| Low flow or loss of circulation |
No flow / Less flow |
Pump trip, blocked strainer, closed valve, cavitation, loss of power, control failure |
Overheating, crystallization, compressor damage, reaction imbalance, local decomposition |
Minimum-flow bypass; pump NPSH margin; robust filtration; automatic standby equipment where justified; instrumentation suitable for the fluid |
Low-flow alarm, trip, standby pump, automatic feed isolation, temperature monitoring |
Consider a safety instrumented function if loss of flow can rapidly create a hazardous state and ordinary control or alarm response is insufficient. |
| Vacuum or low pressure |
Less pressure |
Condensation, blocked vent, rapid cooling, pump-out, incorrect valve alignment |
Tank collapse, implosion, air ingress, flammable mixture formation, contamination |
Vacuum-rated vessel; correctly sized vacuum breaker; controlled venting; oxygen-exclusion strategy; structural verification |
Low-pressure alarm, vacuum relief, nitrogen blanketing, automatic isolation, oxygen monitoring where required |
Determine whether the protective action is a safety instrumented function or a mechanical protection function, then verify independence and proof-test arrangements. |
| Flammable atmosphere or ignition risk |
Other than / More composition |
Air ingress, vapor release, inadequate inerting, static discharge, hot surfaces, electrical faults |
Flash fire, vapor cloud explosion, pool fire, multiple equipment failures |
Hazardous-area suitability; bonding and grounding; inert-gas compatibility; leak-tight design; ventilation; ignition-source control |
LEL detection, inerting control, ventilation interlock, emergency isolation, fire and gas detection |
Assess the complete fire-and-gas and shutdown strategy. SIL may apply to defined shutdown or inerting functions when required by the risk assessment. |
| Toxic or corrosive exposure |
Other than / Reverse |
Wrong material, seal failure, overfilling, incompatible chemical mixing, maintenance error |
Acute poisoning, chemical burns, corrosion damage, environmental contamination |
Chemical compatibility; corrosion-resistant materials; closed transfer; double containment; sampling and draining controls; remote operation where practical |
High-level trip, toxic-gas detection, automatic isolation, scrubber or treatment system, secondary containment |
Use consequence severity, exposure duration, occupancy, and existing safeguards in the risk assessment. Do not infer SIL solely from chemical toxicity. |
| Incorrect level or overfill |
More level / Less level |
Inlet valve failure, faulty measurement, blocked outlet, operator or recipe error |
Overflow, incompatible mixing, vapor release, pump damage, loss of containment |
Independent level measurement; overflow capacity; reliable inlet isolation; suitable vessel geometry; drainability and inspection access |
High-level alarm, independent high-high trip, inlet shutdown, overflow collection, operator procedures |
Independence between basic process control and the protective function should be demonstrated. Include common-cause failure review. |